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One key question that arises from debates about immigration in the U.S. is the degree to 
which restrictive immigration policies, and public support for them, are motivated by prejudice 
toward Hispanics. American lawmakers and citizens who support restrictive policies claim that 
ethnic prejudice, which is defined as antipathy toward a particular group or its members (Allport 
1954; Brown 2010; Stangor 2009),1 plays no role in their anti-immigration positions. Instead, 
these individuals argue that they have legitimate concerns about the economic and cultural 
consequences of unfettered immigration, as well as a desire to impose sanctions on immigrants 
for law-violating behaviors. In other words, the key issue is the immigrants’ transgressive 
behaviors irrespective of their racial or ethnic identity. For example, Roy Beck, the Executive 
Director of Numbers USA, an immigration reduction organization, argues that “the chief 
difficulties that America faces because of current immigration are not triggered by who the 
immigrants are” or “some vision of a homogeneous white America.”2 Echoing these sentiments, 
Alabama state lawmakers recently defended one of the country’s most strident immigration laws, 
                                                 
1
 Allport’s (1954) original definition of prejudice also included the condition that the antipathy be 
“based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization.” However, as Brown (2010) and Stangor 
(2009) note, most scholars have subsequently dropped that requirement from the operational 
definition of prejudice.  
2
 Excerpts accessed from Numbers USA’s organizational website: 
<https://www.numbersusa.com/content/>. Emphasis in italics were added by authors and do not 
appear in the original quote. 
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HB 56, by publicly proclaiming that they “don’t have a problem with Hispanics as people”3 but 
with “illegal immigrants entering the state and taking jobs away from the people of Alabama.”4 
Despite these reassurances, immigration advocates argue that these anti-immigration 
efforts are motivated in part by bigotry and represent a veiled attack on the larger Hispanic 
population. For instance, Isabel Rubio, executive director of the Hispanic Interest Coalition of 
Alabama, contended that “at its core HB 56 is aimed at the Latino community, not the entire 
immigrant community.”5 Indeed, the claim that opposition to immigration is fueled by prejudice 
toward Hispanics is supported by opinion research demonstrating that negative stereotypes and 
affect toward Hispanics serve as significant predictors of support for restrictive immigration 
policies among the American public (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 
1997; Hood and Morris 1997; Valentino, Brader, Jardina 2012). Further, recent research 
demonstrates that Americans associate negativity with Hispanic relative to Anglo immigrants, 
and this implicit bias predicts anti-immigration policy preferences (Perez 2010). In sum, while 
many opponents of immigration claim that their aversion centers upon the behavior of 
immigrants and not their ethnic identity, critics on the left of the debate, along with findings from 
                                                 
3
 Quote from Alabama State Representative Kerry Rich. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.sandmountainreporter.com/news/local/article_b58d77c2-9920-11e0-8a09-
001cc4c03286.html>. 
4
 Quote from Alabama State Senator Scott Beason. Retrieved from:  
<http://www.wncftv.com/localnews/Bentley-Signs-Illegal-Immigration-Reform-Bill-into-Law-
123587664.html>. 
5
 Excerpt taken from an interview given by Rubio on Democracy Now! on October 20, 2011. 
Retrieved from: <http://www.democracynow.org/shows/2011/10/20>.  
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the opinion research, suggest that it is by and large the Hispanic identity of immigrants—not their 
behavior—that matters most in driving public opposition to immigration.  
  In this article, we test whether Hispanic ethnic identity plays a role in shaping public 
reactions to threatening and law-violating behaviors, as well as influencing support for restrictive 
immigration policies. In addition to disclosing a potential ethnicity-based bias in mass opinion on 
immigration, we engage our topic with the larger question in mind of whether the expression of 
prejudice toward Hispanics has gone “underground” and become “coded” in racially or ethnically 
neutral terms in the contemporary U.S. In line with theories of modern racism, which have long 
been used to study white-black relations and anti-black prejudice, we argue that individuals 
understand that openly derogating minorities is socially unacceptable (Crandall et al. 2002), as it 
contradicts core American norms of equality and tolerance (McClosky and Zaller 1984; Sullivan, 
Pierson, and Marcus 1982), as well as the narrative that “America is a nation of immigrants.” 
Instead, the expression of anti-Hispanic sentiment among white Americans6 has been funneled 
into the citation of specific behaviors that are deemed inappropriate, either because they are 
formally illegal or economically and culturally threatening.   
We present data from a series of nationally representative, survey-embedded experiments 
to demonstrate that white respondents do not treat threatening immigrant behavior equally with 
respect to different immigrant groups. Instead, transgressions such as remaining in the country 
without legal documentation, working without paying taxes, and failing to support traditional 
symbols of American culture and identity, are considered more offensive if committed by 
Hispanic than non-Hispanic immigrants. In addition to addressing a timely issue in American 
                                                 
6
 In our usage, the terms “Whites” and “white Americans” exclude individuals who would 
identify themselves as ethnically Hispanic. 
5 
 
politics, these findings make an important contribution to the opinion research on immigration. 
Prior demonstrations of the importance of anti-Hispanic sentiment in shaping opinion on 
immigration are largely correlational in nature (e.g., Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; 
Hood and Morris 1997) and reliant upon explicit measures of prejudice that likely underestimate 
true levels due to social desirability concerns (e.g., Devine et al. 2002; Piston 2010). Our 
experimental design and analyses extend this literature by demonstrating the causal role of an 
immigrant’s ethnic identity in shaping public opposition to immigration in a manner not reliant 
upon self-reported prejudice toward Hispanics. Taken together, our findings demonstrate that the 
ethnic identity of an immigrant influences how Americans react to transgressive behaviors by 
immigrants, and that these ethnicity-based group differences in public reactions shape support for 
restrictive government immigration policies. Ultimately, our findings suggest that the focus 
within popular political discourse on the “illegality” and “threats” of immigrants may indeed 
serve as a coded means of expressing antipathy toward specific immigrant minorities. 
Hispanic Immigrants and Modern Racism Revisited  
At more than 50 million people, Hispanics have supplanted African Americans as the 
largest, and arguably the most salient, minority group in the United States. While white-black 
relations in the U.S. provided the predominant intergroup context in which to study prejudice for 
the better part of the 20th century, substantial and persistent influxes of Latin American 
immigrants have brought Hispanics to the forefront of the study of intergroup relations in 
American politics in the 21st century. While in no way diminishing the importance of the study of 
prejudice toward African Americans or denying its continued existence, white Americans’ 
attitudes toward Hispanics undeniably constitute an emerging and increasingly important arena in 
which to study the dynamics of prejudice in contemporary American society. And, just as the 
study of anti-black prejudice is intricately entangled with the analysis of public opinion within 
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the social welfare and affirmative action policy domains (Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 
1996), the study of anti-Hispanic prejudice is, and will likely remain, closely tied to the analysis 
of public opinion on immigration policy. We aim to apply the lessons learned from the study of 
prejudice toward Blacks in guiding our thinking about the operation of white Americans’ 
prejudice toward Hispanics, specifically as it pertains to preference formation and public 
discourse on immigration. In so doing, we turn to theories of modern racism and their tenets as 
the basis for developing our hypotheses regarding the nature and operation of anti-Hispanic 
prejudice within the U.S.   
Modern racism is an umbrella term for a set of theories addressing a “new” form of 
racism in the U.S. that emerged following the Civil Rights Movement. Known as “modern 
racism” (McConahay 1986), “symbolic racism” (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988), “subtle 
racism” (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), “racial resentment” (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and 
“aversive racism” (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986), these theories, while distinct, all contain the 
same basic tenets that: (1) white Americans recognize changes in societal norms since the 1960s, 
which make it unacceptable to freely express “old fashioned” forms of racial prejudice based 
upon open bigotry toward Blacks; and (2) as a result, a subtle, covert form of racism has emerged 
to supplant earlier, overt expressions of prejudice against African Americans. In essence, scholars 
of modern racism argue that mass racial antipathy among Whites persists, but that it has found 
more inconspicuous and covert avenues of expression in the form of opposition to social welfare 
and liberal racial policies, as well as the belief that Blacks violate traditional American values 
such as individualism, self-reliance, and the Protestant work ethic. 
The key insight of the modern racism perspective is that prejudice became “coded” 
(Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchins, and White 2002), whereby 
antipathy toward Blacks among elites and the masses was reconstituted as a defensibly race-
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neutral and “principled” political opposition to policies intended to advance the interests of black 
Americans. Thus, rather than appealing to explicitly racist considerations, this new coded 
language of opposition to pro-black policies was founded upon seemingly non-racial concerns 
over the rate of societal change, the fairness of special treatment by government to specific 
groups, and the status of traditional values such as hard-work and merit-based rewards. While the 
modern racism perspective is not without its critics or shortcomings (e.g., see Sniderman and 
Carmines 1997), there is a substantial body of evidence in support of its claims (e.g., see Sears 
1988). Moreover, it provides a useful framework for theorizing the operation of prejudice toward 
Hispanics in the contemporary debates over immigration policy in the U.S.  In adapting modern 
racism theory from a white-black to a white-Hispanic intergroup context, the central prediction 
would thus be that Whites’ antipathy toward Hispanic immigrants would be expressed in a covert 
manner—coded by the usage of language and reference to concerns that are not explicitly racial. 
To determine the content of this hypothesized coded language, we need only turn to the 
opinion research and popular political discourse on immigration in the U.S., both of which 
strongly suggest that the most common types of concerns voiced by anti-immigrant politicians, 
media pundits, interest groups, and citizens alike pertain to (1) the law-violating behaviors of 
immigrants who enter or remain in the country illegally, (2) the threats posed by immigrants to 
material resources, and (3) the threats posed by immigrants to American culture (Beck 1996; 
Chavez 2001, 2008; Chomsky 2007; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Cohen 2001; 
Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Huntington 2004; Paxton and Mughan 2006; Simon and 
Alexander 1993).  According to a modern racism perspective, these three broad types of concerns 
may serve as the coded vehicles through which mass anti-Hispanic sentiment is expressed, given 
that these concerns are explicitly nonracial and thus defensibly devoid of overt prejudicial 
content. Thus, our primary hypothesis is that a portion of Whites’ opposition to immigration in 
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the contemporary U.S. is at least partially rooted in anti-Hispanic prejudice, but that this 
prejudice is concealed as overt concern over law-violating behavior, as well as economic and 
cultural threats posed by immigrants. We label this the coded prejudice hypothesis. 
Survey-Embedded Experiments 
 One way in which public opinion scholars have assessed prejudice toward minority group 
members is with survey-embedded experiments.  Largely established by the 1991 National Race 
and Politics Survey,7 this approach involves asking respondents to report their reactions to norm- 
or value-violating behaviors committed by an individual whose racial identity is manipulated 
across randomly assigned experimental groups.  For instance, in one experiment, subjects were 
asked to report their level of anger in response to either “a man” or “a black man” who “collects 
welfare because he is too lazy to get a job.” This type of experimental group cue manipulation 
was developed to reveal anti-black sentiment by enabling researchers to observe whether 
respondents report more negativity when the perpetrator of a norm-violating behavior is black 
rather than of an undefined racial identity.  Within this general experimental paradigm, prejudice 
is revealed through differential reactions to hypothetical behaviors because these behaviors are 
held constant and only the racial identity of the actor is varied. 
To test our coded prejudice hypothesis, we drew upon this basic experimental paradigm 
as the foundation for designing four survey-embedded experiments.  Each of these experiments 
was crafted to present respondents with an immigrant who is engaging in a law-violating or 
threatening behavior, and the primary manipulation concerns whether the perpetrating immigrant 
is ethnically Hispanic or some other ethnicity. For ease of discussion, and to be conceptually 
                                                 
7
 Data collected by the Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, from 
February 1 to November 21, 1991. 
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consistent with extant theoretical frameworks in the intergroup conflict and immigration opinion 
literatures, we classify these violations, or “transgressions,” in terms of realistic and symbolic 
threats posed by immigrants to American society (Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison 2009). Realistic threats focus on 
concern over material resources such as jobs, wages, or taxes (Citrin et al. 1997), while symbolic 
threats concern violations committed by an outgroup to an ingroup’s core set of values, symbols, 
or cultural norms (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Kinder 1985). Both types of transgressions 
can be actual or imagined (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005), and it is perceived violations that 
often lead to antipathy toward immigrants (Sniderman et al. 2004) and support for restrictive 
immigration policies (Citrin et al. 1990; Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997). Prior 
experimental research has demonstrated that information about the costs and benefits of 
immigration influences policy preferences and political action differentially depending upon the 
national origins of the immigrants in question (Brader et al. 2008). However, our work is the first 
to date that explores possible variation in how citizens evaluate a range of transgressive 
immigrant behaviors as a function of the ethnic identity of the perpetrating immigrant.  In so 
doing, our work holds the promise of disclosing how public condemnations of the putative 
transgressions committed by immigrants may contain significant ethnicity-based biases and thus 
serve as a coded vehicle for the expression of antipathy toward Hispanics.  
Sample 
A total of 275 white, non-Hispanic adults participated in our nationally representative, 
random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone survey from March 22nd to June 15th, 2010.8  While modest 
                                                 
8
 A list-assisted method of random digit-dialing (RDD) was used to obtain phone numbers in the 
sample from all 48 contiguous states, including the District of Columbia. Within selected 
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in size, our sample is large enough to provide sufficient power to test for mean differences in 
responses across experimental groups.  We also note that our sample of white Americans 
compares quite well on many key demographic variables to other nationally-recognized RDD 
samples. For comparison, we have included demographic information for white respondents from 
the 2006 Pew Research Center Poll on Immigration and the 2008-2009 American National 
Election Panel Study (see Table 1).9 Our sample contains slightly more females (57%) than 
                                                                                                                                                              
households, individuals 18 years and over were chosen at random for participation. We made 
multiple attempts at each contact number (as many as 7 attempts) in order increase response rates 
and give potentially eligible respondents a reasonable opportunity to participate in the survey. 
Moreover, households and individuals who were initially unwilling to participate in the survey 
were contacted multiple times in an attempt to persuade them to participate. Calls were staggered 
over times of day and days of the week to maximize the chance of making contact with potential 
respondents. In total, 6,032 telephone numbers were dialed, each of which was given a final 
disposition: 3,763 numbers were deemed ineligible (e.g., nonworking, businesses, etc.), 1,109 
numbers were of unknown eligibility (always busy, never answered, etc.), and the remaining 
1,160 numbers were coded as eligible households (275 completes, 304 refusals, 36 non-whites, 
70 language unable, and 475 callbacks). We used two methods of determining levels of 
participation in this survey: (1) The Cooperation Rate (AAPOR Formula #4) was 51.4 percent; 
and (2) the Response Rate (AAPOR Formula #4) was 22.6 percent.   The response rate is a very 
conservative estimate of participation, while the cooperation rate adjusts for the fact that many 
phone numbers in the list are non-eligible. 
9
 The “Pew Research Center Poll: Immigration” was sponsored by the Pew Research Center for 
the People & the Press and the Pew Hispanic Center. A total of 6,003 surveys were com
11 
 
males with ages ranging from 18 to 96 years old (median age = 55 years old). The median 
household income range of the sample is $60,000 to $80,000, and 43% of respondents have 
earned a 4-year college degree. We find that 38% of respondents identified themselves as 
Republicans, 26% as Independents, 29% as Democrats, and 7% as other.10 Ideologically, the 
sample consisted of 37 percent conservatives, 42 percent moderates, and 21 percent liberals. 
The “Overstay Visa” Experiment 
The objective of the first experiment in our survey was to test the coded prejudice 
hypothesis in reference to arguably the most pervasive issue within popular political debate over 
immigration, namely undocumented, or “illegal,” immigration. The central argument that some 
political elites and Americans have made to explain their anti-immigrant sentiment and policy 
positions is that many immigrants violate the law by illegally entering and residing within the 
U.S.  The underlying race-neutral logic of this argument is that opposition to immigration exists 
in response to the transgressive behavior of illegal entry and residence, irrespective of the ethnic 
identity of the immigrants committing such violations. If this contention were true, then it should 
make no difference whether the immigrant is Hispanic, European, or of some other origin; 
instead, the illicit activity should be paramount in driving opposition. 
To test whether this argument truly holds, or if there is indeed an ethnicity-based group 
bias underlying it, we designed a simple experiment, which we call the “Overstay Visa” 
Experiment. In this experiment, we randomly assigned survey respondents to one of three 
hypothetical scenarios in which we varied the ethnic origins of an undocumented immigrant. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
between February 8th and March 7th, 2006. The 2008-2009 American National Election Panel 
Study consists of an Internet panel of 4,240 Americans recruited via RDD sampling methods. 
10
 Percentages do not total 100% because of rounding. 
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exact wording of this manipulation read as follows: “Suppose someone from [Mexico/Britain] 
enters the U.S. with a short-term visa but then stays in this country longer than legally authorized. 
In your view, how serious is this offense on a scale from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means ‘not at all’ and 
‘10’ means ‘very serious’?”11 We chose this form of illegality because it subtly identifies the 
immigrant’s legal status without referring to them explicitly as an illegal immigrant. Further, we 
chose Mexico as the specific Hispanic origin for our experiment because individuals from 
Mexico comprise the majority of the legal and undocumented Hispanic immigrant populations 
within the U.S. (Dockterman 2011; Passel 2006). In addition to the Mexican versus British group 
cues, we also included a control condition, which simply referred to “someone” without 
identifying any particular country of origin. We decided to include an ethnically undefined 
immigrant to serve as a control condition to compare responses to the immigrants from Mexico 
and Britain (e.g., see Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2006). If prejudice is not a factor in 
determining Whites’ attitudes, then respondents should not judge unauthorized immigrants from 
Mexico any differently than they do those from the United Kingdom (or those without a defined 
country of origin). If, on the other hand, respondents do differentiate by nationality, such that 
they view transgressions by Hispanics as being more offensive than those of an undocumented 
immigrant from Britain or an unnamed country, then we can assume that negative group affect 
toward Hispanics is at work. 
The “Under the Table” Experiment 
The goal of the second experiment was to move beyond the former by confronting 
participants with a particularly egregious realistic violation and test for the presence of group-
based differentiation in respondents’ reactions. In our “Under the Table” Experiment, we present 
                                                 
11
 For ease of interpretation, we recoded this and all subsequent variables from 0 to 1. 
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respondents with a scenario in which the same undocumented immigrant from the prior 
experiment is now failing to pay taxes on earned income: “Now suppose this person with an 
expired visa [from Mexico/Britain] is working ‘under the table’ and does not pay taxes on this 
income.” Failing to pay taxes not only violates the law, but also norms of fairness. As such, this 
particular transgression should serve as an important argument to justify opposition to 
immigration, since people commonly perceive that undocumented immigrants use more services 
(e.g., healthcare, education, etc.) than they pay for in their share of taxes. As in the Overstay Visa 
Experiment, this experiment also included a neutral control condition where respondents are 
asked to react to an ethnically undefined immigrant committing the transgression of working 
illegally and not paying taxes.  For consistency, assignments to experimental group cue 
conditions for this experiment were the same as the Overstay Visa Experiment.12 
The “Foreign Flag” Experiment 
The previous two experiments were designed to test whether white Americans would 
deem realistic transgressions as more flagrant offenses when committed by Hispanic rather than 
non-Hispanic immigrants. Following these initial realistic experiments, our survey shifted in 
focus to symbolic, culturally-oriented transgressive behaviors.  In contrast to arousing legal or 
material concerns, these behaviors center upon the perceived failure of an immigrant to assimilate 
to American society, which involves threats to important symbols of American identity and 
culture. Once again, paying attention to symbolic violations is important, given that a good deal 
of opinion research on immigration has found that cultural concerns often matter more than 
                                                 
12
 For instance, a respondent who was presented with the scenario of a Mexican immigrant 
overstaying his or her visa was later asked to evaluate the seriousness of this same Hispanic 
immigrant working without paying income taxes. 
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economic concerns in shaping public opposition to immigration (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 
1990; Hood and Morris 1997; Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). Thus, pointing to 
cultural grievances related to immigration may serve as a particularly available and coded way to 
express antipathy toward some ethnic groups over others. 
In the “Foreign Flag” Experiment, we focus on the symbolic transgression of displaying a 
national flag from one’s home country rather than the American flag. National flags are potent 
symbols of cultural identity (e.g., see Schatz and Lavine 2007), and symbolic behaviors involving 
the use of flags by immigrants have been documented to resonate with American elites and the 
masses. For example, in defending his argument that Hispanic immigration poses an 
unprecedented threat to American culture, Huntington (2004) recounts how Mexican immigrants 
protesting California’s Proposition 187 marched through the streets of Los Angeles waving 
scores of Mexican flags while holding American flags upside down. Our assumption is that 
displaying the flag of another country should be interpreted as a significant symbolic violation in 
that these individuals will be seen as not taking pride in the U.S.  For the purposes of this 
experiment, respondents were presented with the following scenario: “Suppose someone in your 
neighborhood chose not to display the American flag but instead displayed the national flag of 
[Mexico/Canada] in their front yard.” Respondents were randomly assigned to either a Mexico or 
Canada group cue condition,13 and were then asked to report how offended they would be in 
response to this behavior on a scale of 0 (“not at all offended”) to 10 (“very offended”). 
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 Unlike the previous realistic experiments, our symbolic experiments involved only two 
conditions, and respondents were randomly assigned to either condition for each individual 
symbolic experiment. Our decision to exclude the race-neutral control condition for the symbolic 
experiments stemmed from our concern that the prior exposure to group cues in the realistic 
15 
 
The “Foreign Team” Experiment  
In addition to displaying a foreign flag, rooting for a foreign team in a sporting event may 
serve as a salient symbolic transgression in the eyes of many American citizens. Once again, 
Huntington (2004) provides anecdotal evidence by discussing how Mexican Americans booed 
the U.S. national anthem and assaulted American players during a U.S.-Mexico soccer match in 
Los Angles in 1998. According to Huntington, this transgressive behavior indicates a dramatic 
rejection of American identity (and assertion of Mexican identity), which is an integral feature of 
the supposed cultural threat posed by Hispanic immigrants to American society. To simulate this 
cultural violation, we created the “Foreign Team” Experiment: “Suppose that you are watching 
the Olympic Games. How offended would you be if someone were cheering for Team 
[Mexico/Canada] to win a gold medal instead Team USA?” We opted for an Olympic match in 
part because our survey was conducted only a few weeks after the 2010 Winter Olympic Games 
at a time when national sports pride should have been relatively salient. Respondents were 
randomly assigned to either the Mexico or Canada condition for this fourth and final experiment. 
Results 
                                                                                                                                                              
experiments could prime respondents in the neutral condition. Thus, participants in an 
unidentified symbolic condition, had we included one, could conceivably be primed to think of 
that “someone” as Mexican, British, or truly undefined, which would undermine the integrity of 
contrasts in responses to respondents assigned to the explicit Mexico or Canada conditions. To 
eliminate this possibility, our symbolic experiments explicitly specify the ethnic origins of the 
immigrant in question.  In addition, we changed the ethnicity of the non-Hispanic immigrant in 
our symbolic experiments from British to Canadian to demonstrate that our results hold across 
different white immigrants. 
16 
 
The effects of our group-cue experimental manipulations across our realistic and 
symbolic experiments are depicted in Figure 1 as mean differences across conditions in 
seriousness ratings for each offense. Above the bars, we provide regression coefficients and 
associated significance levels based upon regressions of the perceived seriousness of each 
transgressive behavior on the relevant experimental treatment dummy variables (the Hispanic 
group cue always served as the excluded category). We begin with the results from the Overstay 
Visa Experiment, which are presented in the leftmost portion of Figure 1. Clearly, respondents 
viewed residing in the U.S. without legal documentation as a major transgression, as the mean 
response for all three conditions was well above the scale midpoint. However, consistent with our 
coded prejudice hypothesis, respondents differentiated by the immigrant’s ethnicity, such that 
they rated the Hispanic immigrant as committing a more serious offense than the other 
immigrants: The mean seriousness ratings for Mexican immigrants was 0.76, while for British 
and unspecified immigrants it was 0.67 and 0.68, respectively. Regression results confirm that 
the perceived offense was significantly less in the British (B= -.09, SE= .04, p < .05) and the 
undefined conditions (B = -.09, SE = .04, p < .05) relative to those who received the Mexican 
group cue. It is also worth noting that seriousness ratings did not significantly differ when the 
hypothetical immigrant hailed from Britain rather than from an unspecified country (B = -.01, SE 
= .04, p = .88). 
The results from this first experiment demonstrate that white Americans, while holding 
true to a general opposition to law-violating immigrant behavior, nevertheless do react differently 
to the transgression of being in the country illegally depending on the ethnicity of the 
perpetrating immigrant. To build on this initial result and test whether respondents punished 
Hispanics who work illegally and fail to pay income taxes more than other immigrants 
committing the same offense, we turn attention to the mean offense ratings by experimental 
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condition for the Under the Table Experiment. Figure 1 reveals that respondents deemed this type 
of offense as the worst transgression (of the four experiments); yet, despite having such a high 
floor for the perceived offense across the three conditions, we nonetheless observe respondents 
differentiating among immigrants by group membership. The mean seriousness ratings for each 
of the experimental conditions are 0.88 for Hispanic immigrants, 0.84 for British immigrants, and 
0.80 for unspecified immigrants. Respondents deemed the offense of working illegally and not 
paying taxes significantly less serious when perpetrated by an undefined immigrants (i.e., 
“someone”) than a Mexican immigrant (B = -.08, SE = .03, p<.05).  Additionally, we find 
directional support for our coded prejudice hypothesis as the immigrant working under the table 
from Britain was rated less harshly than the Mexican immigrant doing the same, however, this 
effect failed to attain conventional levels of statistical significance (B = -.04, SE = .03, p = .20). 
Once again, white respondents did not make any distinction between British versus generic 
undocumented immigrants (B = .03, SE = .03, p = .24). 
Next, we turn to the results from our symbolic threat experiments. The results from our 
Foreign Flag Experiment, which are presented in the third portion of Figure 1, reveal that 
respondents viewed this type of transgression as a much less serious offense in general than the 
earlier realistic transgressions; however, participants again indicated that they were significantly 
more offended when a Hispanic immigrant committed this type of cultural offense: The mean 
seriousness rating for Hispanic immigrants is 0.54 compared to only 0.32 for Canadian 
immigrants (B = -.22, SE =.05, p<.001), which corresponds to a 68 percent increase in 
seriousness ratings. We find a similar pattern of results for the Foreign Team Experiment, which 
are presented in the rightmost portion of Figure 1. As hypothesized, respondents were 
significantly more offended when someone cheers for the Mexican national team compared to the 
Canadian team: The mean response to this type of symbolic transgression is 0.20 for Hispanic 
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immigrants but only 0.11 for Canadian immigrants (B = -.09, SE =.04, p<.05). This finding is in 
line with the results from the prior symbolic offense experiment, as well as those from the two 
preceding realistic experiments, in demonstrating that white Americans are significantly more 
affronted by transgressive behavior when committed by a Hispanic rather than stereotypically 
white immigrant.  
What is important to reiterate is that if Whites were concerned about transgressive or 
threatening immigrant behavior in a manner devoid of ethnic prejudice, then we should not have 
found significant differences in perceived offensiveness across experimental conditions. Our 
results show otherwise. We find significant and persistent differences in offense perceptions 
revealing a consistent bias against Hispanic immigrants.  
Alternative Hypotheses 
The experimental paradigm we drew upon in designing our survey experiments suggests 
the differences in offense perceptions observed across experimental conditions, because the 
behavior of the immigrants in each experiment is held constant, are solely attributable to a change 
in the ethnicity of the immigrant committing the transgression. Although we believe that the 
results from our experiments demonstrate prejudice against Hispanics by clearly depicting 
differential reactions toward individuals due to their group membership, we acknowledge that 
there may be alternative explanations for the observed results that deserve some discussion. For 
instance, it is possible that our survey respondents reacted more negatively to the Mexican 
immigrant than to other immigrants because of actual or perceived differences in their 
populations, rates of illegal entry, skill levels, or any other characteristics associated with one 
immigrant group relative to the others. In other words, what we have labeled as anti-Hispanic 
prejudice could simply reflect genuine concerns about Hispanics’ higher rates of illegal entry into 
the U.S. and subsequently larger undocumented population, as well as their lower socioeconomic 
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status relative to British or Canadian immigrants. Thus, one alternative hypothesis is that 
respondents could have been more concerned about the prevalence of the transgressive behaviors 
rather than the specific ethnic identity of the offending immigrant. A skeptic could argue that 
participants may have been willing to overlook what they perceived to be an isolated incident, but 
they would have had more difficulty ignoring widespread disregard for the law. 
A second and related alternative hypothesis is that some respondents in our realistic 
experiments may have felt economically threatened by a large influx of low-skilled workers with 
whom they might be in direct competition (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). This economic threat 
hypothesis has some face validity given the negativity of recent media coverage, in which 
Hispanic immigrants have been described as posing threats to labor market competition, 
increasing the consumption of public services, and heightening the tax burden on Americans 
(Brader,Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Chavez 2001; King 2000; Valentino et al. 2012). Indeed, this 
economic competition explanation is consistent with supporters of Alabama’s HB 56, who have 
claimed that they are simply interested in “protecting American jobs.” 
To address these two alternative hypotheses, we first remind readers that both of our 
realistic experiments included an ethnically undefined immigrant to serve as a true control 
condition. Note that this ethnically undefined cue simply referred to “someone” committing a set 
of transgressive behaviors, rather than the more loaded term “immigrant,” which is likely to be 
associated with Hispanics (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2012). Moreover, the generic 
individual in our hypothetical scenarios should not have conveyed any systematic information 
about the offending immigrant’s group size, rate of illegal entry, skill level, or any other 
potentially important attributes. Recall that we discovered that our control condition operated 
exactly as we had expected: Respondents reacted more negatively to the Hispanic immigrant 
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compared to the non-Hispanic immigrant, whether the immigrant was specifically identified as 
British or simply as “someone.” 
To further dispel these alternative hypotheses, we conducted additional analyses in which 
we tested whether respondents’ perceptions about the size of the illegal immigrant population 
that is of Hispanic origin, as well as respondents’ education and income levels, moderated the 
effects of our group cue manipulations. If concerns about the size of the undocumented Hispanic 
immigrant population or economic threat were driving our results in the realistic, and to a lesser 
extent, symbolic experiments, then we would expect individuals who deem illegal immigration as 
a particularly prevalent issue or are most vulnerable to the economic threat of labor market 
competition with low-skilled workers to react most negatively to the transgressive behaviors of 
the Mexican immigrant. The results of our moderated regressions, in which we interacted a 
treatment dummy variable14 with the perceived proportion of the Hispanic population that is 
undocumented, education, and income,15 are presented in Table 2. Across our four experiments, 
                                                 
14
 As there were no significant differences in main effects between the non-Hispanic treatment 
conditions in our realistic experiments (i.e., British and undefined cues), we opted to combine 
them into a single category. Thus, we used a dichotomous group cue variable for our analyses (1 
= Mexico; 0 = non-Hispanic). The coding for the symbolic experiments was similar (1 = Mexico; 
0 = Canadian).  
15
 Perceptions about the illegal immigrant population of Hispanic origin came from responses to 
the following question: “If you had to guess, what percentage of the Hispanic immigrant 
population is living in the U.S. without legal documentation?” Responses ranged from “0%” to 
“100%,” with a mean of 42.3% and a standard deviation of 24.6%. Education is a 6-point scale, 
where a graduate degree serves as the highest category. Household income is a 8-point scale 
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we find no evidence any of these alternative factors moderate the effect of being told a Mexican 
immigrant is perpetrating each transgression on reported seriousness ratings. In other words, our 
main treatment effects are not conditional upon individual differences in beliefs about the 
pervasiveness of Hispanic illegal immigration, education (and likely skill levels), or income. 
These null findings are consistent with recent research by Valentino, Brader, and Jardina (2012), 
who find no evidence that economic vulnerability affects negative beliefs about immigration, as 
well as others who show that economic self-interest factors little into opinion on immigration 
(Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).16 
                                                                                                                                                              
based upon $20,000 increments, and missing values were imputed in Stata based upon gender, 
education, age (and its squared term), and employment status. For ease of interpretation, all 
variables were recoded from 0 to 1. 
16
 Kinder and Kam (2010) demonstrate that ethnocentrism, or “a predisposition to divide the 
human world into in-groups and out-groups” (p.8), strongly predicts anti-immigrant sentiment. 
They argue that individuals are predisposed to favor their ingroup at the expense of outgroups, 
and that antipathy toward outgroups should increase as a function of the cultural, linguistic, and 
ethnic distance of an outgroup to one's ingroup. According to this approach, the operative 
mechanism underlying our experimental findings could be general aversion to outgroups and 
“prejudice broadly defined” (Kinder and Kam, 2010, p.52), rather than group-specific prejudice 
toward Hispanics divorced from an encapsulating ethnocentrism. While this alternative and more 
general framework could account for findings such as ours, this hypothesis is directly challenged 
by evidence that specific attitudes toward Hispanics, not ethnocentrism, influence immigration 
policy preferences (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2012). In light of these countervailing 
findings, we should note that the primary goal of this article is to test for the existence of bias 
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Indirect Effects of Group Cue Treatments on Policy Preferences 
In addition to identifying a systematic bias against Hispanics in public reactions to 
transgressive immigrant behavior, we are also interested in the larger political ramifications of 
how this “hidden” bias toward Hispanics influences support for restrictive immigration policies. 
To this end, we estimate a series of path models to test the indirect effect of the Mexico treatment 
on two key immigration policy items through its impact on perceived violation seriousness. The 
first immigration policy, labeled Deport Illegals, concerns attitudes toward undocumented 
immigrants already residing within the U.S.: “What do you think should happen to 
undocumented immigrants who have lived and worked in the United States for at least two years: 
Should they be given a chance to keep their jobs and eventually apply for legal status, or should 
they be deported back to their native country?” Responses to this question have been coded so 
that a value of 1 means “deported,” while 0 means “apply for legal status.” The other policy item, 
labeled Border Fence, concerns preventing undocumented immigration from crossing the border: 
“Do you support or oppose building a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border to prevent people from 
illegally entering the country?” Responses to this 4-point item ranged from “strongly support” to 
“strongly oppose,” where higher scores indicate a preference for restricting the border. For our 
mediational analyses, we used a dichotomous group cue treatment variable, which is coded “1” 
                                                                                                                                                              
toward Hispanics by determining whether individuals evaluate the transgressive behaviors of 
Hispanic immigrants more negatively than those of non-Hispanic immigrants. Adjudicating 
whether the demonstrated bias in our experiments stems from prejudice toward Hispanics 
embedded within general ethnocentrism is beyond the scope of this article. 
23 
 
for those receiving the Hispanic group cue and “0” for those receiving the non-Hispanic group 
cue.17 
We present the results of our mediational analyses18 in Figure 2 (for full results see Table 
3), where the upper panel displays the path models for the deportation dependent variable, and 
the lower panel shows the path models affecting preferences for a U.S.-Mexico border fence. The 
leftmost portion of each panel redisplays the significant direct effects of the group cue treatments 
on the violation seriousness ratings, which now serve as mediators in the path analyses. Next, the 
rightmost portion of each panel demonstrates that each perceived offense mediator significantly 
and substantially increases support for restrictive immigration policies. Last, the indirect effects, 
or “causal mediation effects” (Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto 2011), are italicized and 
displayed above or below each violation mediator. The indirect effects can be interpreted as the 
change in the probability of supporting a restrictive immigration policy corresponding to a 
change in the value of the perceived offence mediator produced by moving from the control to 
treatment conditions. The results reveal that the causal mediation effects are significant in 7 of 
                                                 
17
 Once again, we opted to collapse the British and undefined treatments from our realistic 
experiments because we found no significant differences in main effects between these 
conditions. 
18
 To estimate the mediated effects of our group cue treatments on policy preferences, we used 
the mediation package in R© (Tingley et al. 2012) to regress 1) a continuous measure of 
perceived offensiveness of a given violation on a dichotomous group cue treatment variable using 
OLS, and 2) a categorical immigration policy item on the perceived offensiveness of a given 
violation, as well as a dichotomous treatment variable, using probit or ordered probit link 
functions.  
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the 8 path models (i.e., p<.05), and on average, the indirect effects amount to a .07 increase in the 
probability of support for restrictive immigration policies across our path models.  
These significant causal indirect effects reveal that receiving the Hispanic group cue 
increased support for restrictive immigration policies by significantly heightening the perceived 
seriousness of each realistic and symbolic transgressive behavior. That is, respondents in the 
Hispanic group cue condition deemed overstaying one’s visa, working under the table, displaying 
a foreign flag, and cheering for a foreign team as a more egregious violation than those in the 
non-Hispanic conditions, and these heightened violation perceptions in turn directly increased 
support for two distinct restrictive immigration policies. In essence, the results from these 
mediational analyses demonstrate that the disclosed ethnicity-based group bias in public reactions 
to transgressive immigrant behaviors has meaningful policy effects. Specifically, the decoded 
amount of antipathy toward immigrants of Hispanic origin compared to other immigrants 
significantly feeds into support for restrictive immigration policies. If support for restrictive 
immigration policies were truly based upon concern over law-violating behaviors, and if this 
concern lacked any concealed ethnic prejudice, then the only significant path observed in our 
figure would be the one linking perceived seriousness of offense to policy preferences.  Our data 
reveal that this is simply not the case. 
General Discussion 
As we delve further into the 21st century, ethnic change and increasing diversity will 
undoubtedly serve as potent forces shaping the social and political scene in the U.S. Yearly 
influxes of immigrants from Latin America, along with high birth rates among Hispanic 
households, will continue to place Hispanics at the center of political debates and conflict over 
issues of immigration, multiculturalism, and other policy areas associated with racial and ethnic 
minorities, such as affirmative action and social welfare. To date, debates about immigration 
25 
 
policy have assumed an important position alongside other social and cultural issues in defining 
the major division between the political left and right in the American mass public. The critical 
question lurking underneath these debates about immigration in contemporary American politics 
is the role of prejudice as a contributing factor to this political polarization.  
In turning to public political discourse for an answer, one is left with a stalemate. 
Opponents of immigration defend themselves against accusations of racism with non-racial 
rationalizations for their preferred policies. These rationalizations center upon concerns over law 
enforcement, economic opportunity and well-being, and the protection of cherished cultural 
norms and institutions.  Pro-immigration groups and citizens on the left of the issue retort that 
these justifications merely serve as a veil for ethnically-motivated attacks on Hispanic 
populations throughout the country. Scholarly research on public opinion toward immigration 
generally supports the latter’s claims, as prejudice and negative stereotypes toward Hispanics 
bolsters support for restrictive immigration policies.  That being said, intergroup threat research 
also finds that concern over the economic and cultural impacts of immigration serve as powerful 
sources of support for restrictive policies, even when controlling for prejudice toward Hispanics 
(e.g., Citrin et al. 1997). Yet, one limitation of much of this research is that it is largely 
correlational in nature. Ultimately, popular and academic treatments of the sources of public 
support for anti-immigrant policies leaves an uneasy degree of uncertainty concerning the role of 
prejudice in shaping opposition to immigration.  
 In this article, we conducted a series of survey-embedded experiments to tease out the 
distinct role of prejudice in shaping public opinion on immigration. Across four separate 
experiments, our analyses demonstrate that while the American public does care about 
immigrants’ transgressive behaviors, they also significantly distinguish between the immigrants 
who are engaging in these behaviors. Consistent across our studies, we find that white Americans 
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take significantly greater offense to transgressions like being in the country without legal 
documentation, working illegally and not paying taxes, and rejecting symbols of American 
culture and identity, when the perpetrating immigrant is Hispanic rather non-Hispanic. One major 
implication of the findings from our studies is that it provides an evidentiary basis for viewing the 
claim of race-neutrality and non-prejudice among opponents of immigration as suspect.  Indeed, 
our studies uncover an important “hidden” ethnicity-based group bias in public reactions to 
immigrants. Beyond this, however, the most novel feature of our findings is the demonstrated 
effects of this hidden bias on policy attitudes, where the portion of reported offense in response to 
transgressive immigrant behaviors explained by manipulated variation in the perpetrating 
immigrant’s ethnic identity significantly influenced immigration policy preferences. 
 In sum, from the opinion research on immigration we know that there is a significant 
degree of anti-immigrant sentiment among the public, and that this corresponds to support for a 
variety of controversial restrictive immigration policies at the federal and state level. What the 
findings from our survey experiments suggest is that a unique portion of this sentiment is 
grounded in group-based prejudice.  Interestingly, however, this prejudice is hidden under the 
surface because it is coded into the race-neutral language of concern over the threatening 
behavior of immigrants.  Our findings suggest that the importance of threat in predicting attitudes 
may in part be due to its current employment as a “coded” vehicle through which prejudice 
toward Hispanics is expressed and translated into political opposition to immigration. 
One issue left open for future research is whether the “coding” of prejudice toward 
Hispanics is a conscious versus unconscious process.  For example, do citizens, who are 
simultaneously aware of their own prejudice and social norms discouraging its expression, 
consciously alter their language of opposition to immigration? Or, do the biases we observed 
operate by a process of non-conscious mobilization of unacknowledged racial antipathies? 
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Additionally, to what extent are coding processes—be they conscious or unconscious—achieved 
by citizens alone or with the aid of elite frames that implicitly harness prejudice as their 
underlying source of popular resonance?  We believe that addressing these types of questions and 
issues would indeed be a fruitful direction for future research.  
The larger significance of decoding mass antipathy toward Hispanics pertains to 
determining pathways toward the achievement of meaningful and over-due immigration reforms, 
as well as the promotion of social and civil harmony among Whites and growing immigrant 
minorities in the U.S.  If concerns over illegality, economic competition, and cultural assimilation 
are the culprits standing in the way of these goals, then the solutions, beyond the provision of 
available factual information to quell these concerns, would be law enforcement, employment 
eligibility verification systems in conjunction with policies to create more and new jobs for 
Americans, and policies aimed at facilitating the assimilation of immigrants.  If, on the other 
hand, the culprit is a simple, yet masked, ethnic prejudice toward salient immigrant groups, then 
the solutions would shift toward official efforts aimed at reducing and undermining mass 
prejudice through programs promoting positive intergroup contact between white Americans and 
residentially proximate Hispanic populations.  
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Table 1. Sample Comparisons by Key Demographic Variables  
 
Decoding Prejudice, 
2009 
Pew Research Poll: 
Immigration, 2006 
ANES Panel Study, 
2008-2009 
Female 57.0% 52.4% 56.1% 
Age (median years) 55.0 51.0 52.0 
College Graduate 42.9% 39.1% 43.1% 
Income (median category) $60,000 to $79,999 $50,000 to $74,999 $60,00 to $74,999 
Employed 57.5% 64.1% 63.3% 
Democrat 29.1% 27.3% 31.0% 
Independent 25.8% 32.0% 31.7% 
Republican 37.8% 35.4% 37.3% 
Other / No Party Affiliation 7.3% 5.2% --- 
N 275 1409 3292 
Note: The “Pew Research Center Poll: Immigration,” sponsored by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and the Pew Hispanic Center, was 
conducted between February 8th and March 7th, 2006. The 2008-2009 American National Election Panel Study recruited respondents via telephone to 
participate in online surveys from January 2008 and September 2009. Summary statistics are from white respondents only. Percentages do not add to 100 due 
to rounding and missing values. Whenever possible, derived variables were used in the ANES sample. 
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Figure 1. Perceived Seriousness of Each Violation by Experimental Condition 
 
 
Notes: Bars represent the mean levels of perceived seriousness of each offense, and entries above the bars reflect the mean difference between the Mexican group 
cue treatment and the non-Hispanic or control conditions (i.e., entries are unstandardized regression coefficients). *p<.05, **p<01, ***p<.001 level.  
Significance levels are based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests. 
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Table 2. Testing Alternative Explanations: Moderated Regression Models of Group Cues on Seriousness Ratings 
 Realistic Transgressions Symbolic Transgressions 
 
Overstay 
Visa 
Work Under 
Table 
Display 
Foreign Flag 
Cheer for 
Foreign Team 
Treatment         
Hispanic Group Cue .06 (.11) -.00 (.09) -.02 (.16) -.06 (.12) 
Moderators         
% Hispanic Illegal .25** (.08) .10 (.06) .37** (.12) .21* (.09) 
Education -.13† (.07) -.17** (.06) -.41*** (.11) -.29*** (.08) 
Income -.06 (.09) -.09 (.08) .05 (.13) -.09 (.10) 
Interactions         
Hispanic Cue X % Hispanic Illegal .09 (.13) .08 (.10) -.02 (.19) -.04 (.15) 
Hispanic Cue X Education .04 (.13) .00 (.10) .09 (.18) .20 (.14) 
Hispanic Cue X Income -.06 (.14) .07 (.11) .01 (.21) -.08 (.16) 
Constant .67*** (.06) .92*** (.05) .49***  .29*** (.07) 
N 237 239 239 240 
R² .13 .13 .13 .11 
     
Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares regression. †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<01, ***p<.001 level.   Significance levels 
are based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests.  
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Figure 2. Indirect Effects of Group Cue Treatments on Restrictive Immigration Policy Preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: N ~ 275. Entries are the direct and indirect effects from 8 path models estimated using Imai et al.’s (2011) mediation package in R©. The direct effects for 1) the binary 
treatments on the continuous mediators are OLS coefficients, and 2) the mediators on the categorical outcome variables are probit or ordered probit coefficients. The indirect 
effects (listed above the mediators) are the change in the probability of supporting a restrictive immigration policy corresponding to a change in the value of the perceived offence 
mediator produced by moving from the control to treatment conditions. †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 level. Significance levels are based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests.
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Table 3.                Mediated Effects of Experimental Treatments on Policy Attitudes 
 Effect on Mediator  Effect on Policy Attitudes 
 Violation Seriousness 
   Deport Illegals Border Fence 
I. Overstay Visa Experiment 
      Group Cue Treatment .09** (.03) .03 (.18) -.18 (.14) 
Violation Seriousness    2.36*** (.35) 2.32*** (.28) 
Mediated Effects of 
Group Cue Treatment          
  
      Total Effect   .09 .02 
      Indirect Effect   .07** .07* 
      Prop. Total Effect Mediated   .87 4.68 
II. Under the Table Experiment   
 
   
Group Cue Treatment .06* (.03) .07 (.17) -.12 (.14) 
Violation Seriousness  
  
2.40*** (.44) 2.25*** (.33) 
Mediated Effects of 
Group Cue Treatment          
  
      Total Effect   .09 .01 
      Indirect Effect   .06** .05* 
      Prop. Total Effect Mediated   .69 .82 
III. Foreign Flag Experiment     
 
 
Group Cue Treatment .22*** (.05) -.22 (.17) .05 (.14) 
Violation Seriousness    1.32*** (.22) 1.05*** (.18) 
Mediated Effects of 
Group Cue Treatment          
 
 
      Total Effect   .02 .10 
      Indirect Effect   .10*** .08* 
      Prop. Total Effect Mediated   4.21 .78 
IV. Foreign Team Experiment     
 
 
Group Cue Treatment .09* (.04) .01 (.16) -.00 (.13) 
Violation Seriousness    .84** (.28) 1.09*** (.24) 
Mediated Effects of 
Group Cue Treatment          
 
 
      Total Effect   .03 .04 
      Indirect Effect   .03 .04† 
      Prop. Total Effect Mediated   .93 1.00 
Notes: N~275. Entries are the direct and indirect effects from 8 path models estimated using Imai et al.’s (2011) mediation package in R©. The 
direct effects for 1) the binary treatments on the continuous mediators are OLS coefficients, and 2) the mediators on the categorical outcome 
variables are probit or ordered probit coefficients. The indirect effects (listed above the mediators) are the change in the probability of supporting 
a restrictive immigration policy corresponding to a change in the value of the perceived offence mediator produced by moving from the control 
to treatment conditions. †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<01, ***p<.001 level. Significance levels are based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests 
 
